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PROSPECTS IN GERMANY

In a few weeks a conference 00 Germany will be held in Geneva .

It will

be a conference of the foreign ministers of the \'l estern nations and the Soviet

Union.

Free Germans of the West and Communist Germans of the East w1ll be present.

This Conference 1s likely to be followed by another 1n the summer--a conference
of President Eisenhower and other Western heads of state and

Mr~

Khrushchev.

We me.y expect that these two principal conferences will be supplemented

by a great deal of diplomatic exchange
various combinations.
muniet nations.

and

other contacts at all levels end in

There will be meetings among representatives of the com-

There will be meetings among representatives of the free nations.

There will be meetings between the free and the communist.

In short, we are 1n

for talk, a great deal of talk in the days ahead.

Procedures and the Coming Conferences
We may anticipate that there will be disagreements--serious disagree.
ments--even before the stage of negotiating the problems of peace 1s reached.
There will be arguments over who should talk and who shoul.d not; whether talk
should begin at the sUlIUllit and. echo down to the base or begin at the base and
rise up to the summit.
place.

Some of these arguments, indeed, have already taken

There will be others.
Let me say that I appreciate the importance of these preliminaries.

The manner in which they are dealt with will have an effect on the prospects
for peace.
is equally

It 1s important that procedural questions be discussed fully.
~ortant,

It

however, that they be discussed with one object in view--

the facilitating of sound agreements for peace.

Procedural quest10ns are not or
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ought not to be wrangled over for the purposes of
evasion of responsibilities .

queRtions are important.

fac~savlng, prop~~nda

or the

Let us recognize, by all means, that procedural

But let us recognize, too, that the basic procedural

problem which conf'ronts us 1s not who talks with whom and wben.

Rather, it 1s:

What kind of talk 1s likely to produce meaniogf'uJ. agreement?

I believe it is reasonable to say that decent men and vomen--in Russia
or in Poland no 1es8 than in the United States or the United Kingdom are not interested in propaganda conferences or face-Baving conferences .

They are not In-

terested in conferences which merely restate platitudes on the virtues of peace.

They are interested in conferences which will get on w1th the business of peacemaking.

They will expect of those who participate in these conferences less COD-

cern with the problem. of saving face and more with the problem ot saving civilization.

They vill pray- for the success of these conferences wherever they meet,

wboever may participate in them , ....henever they are held.

Object of the Coming Conferences
When we speak of praying for the success of these conferences, we ought

to have clearly in mind some concept of what we .mean by success.

Do we mean the

kind of success which characterized the Geneva Conference in 19551

That con-

ference produced pleasant generalizations on the virtues of peace.

A year later ,

however, ....e were back to business as usual , to the business of propaganda war and
cold war .
peace .

Now, four years after Geneva, ....e are ....ithout ta.ngible achievements for

On the contrary, ....e are entering the most critical period in international

r elations since the Korean conflict.
Nor can we mean, when we pray for the success of these impending conferences , peace at any price.

I do not believe the people of this nation are

prepared to sacrifice the future of their chil dren in freedom for a moment of
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surcease from the pressures and tensions of life today on the brink of war.

No, I do not think we mean either of these alternatives when we say that
we pray for the success of these conferences.

I believe that we mean we hgpe for

Rxogress towards sensible agreements which will permit us to live and. to let live,

which will substitute

co~etltlon

in the realm of ideas and buman echlevement for

competition on the battlefields, which will reduce the dangers of hostility among
nations now glaring at each other across the black and bottomless pit of nuclear

war.

In short, we hope for agreements which promise some measure of stability

for a.1.l mankind..

We hope for agreements which will reduce the likelihood of armed.

conflict not only for today but for tomorrow and tomorrow.

We hope for agreements

wbich at least will begin to remove the residual injustices of World War II and
its chaotic

aftermath~-injustices

which, almost fifteen years later, still press

upon the backs of the peoples of many lands.
It is one thing to bope, in these terms, for the success of the coming
conferences.

It will be another to bring the hope to fruition.

In international

aspirations as in human aspirations, there is, inevitably, a gap between what

'We

would like to do and what we are likely to be able to do.
The best chance of closing this gap, I believe, lies in approaching the
impending conference with neither an excess of expectation nor with a cynical
disbelief in their prospects of yiel<ling anything constructive.

'l'lhat we need

most in the da,ys and weeks of talk vb.1ch lie ahead is a clear and a specific
understanding of what it is that we want to bring about by these talks.

We need

a positive purpose which is adJusted to the realities of the existing situation
in t he world.

We need ideas, new ideas, realistic ideas, which may help us to

realize this purpose.

It is important to remember in this connection that in the

realm of international negotiation, the search for all is likely to yield nothing.
~e

intelligent pursuit of what is reasonable may lead to more than we dared hope

!9!.!.

-

.. -

The Need for the Conferences
Before we can clarity our purpoaes 1n the impending conferences, 1 t is

essential to appreciate the origins of these conference s.

Why, we may well ask

ourselves, is it necessary to talk with the Russians at all at this time, about
Germany or any other subject for that matter?

West to meet?

Has Mr. Khrushchev compelled the

Are we merely r esponding, reluctantly, reticently, to a changing

whim 1n Soviet policy?

Are we going into these conferences

88

though. they were

some evil communist brew which we have no choice but to drink?

If that 1s our concept, if we see the origins of the conferences 1n

-

these terms then I say, in all. seriousness, that it is preferable not to go into

them.

We do not have to drink of the cup that 1s proferred.

If we can conceive

of our participation in these conferences as nothtng more than a submission to

Soviet threats or an entrapment by Soviet blandishments then I eay again it 1s
better not to SO into them; it is better, not to delude ourselves .
Seen in these terms, the Conferences will yield nothing worth the having.

They may p:c.'oduce proPaganda.

faces.

They may produce platitudes .

'lbey may save

They will not produce a worthwhile basis for dw-able peace in Germany and

Europe or anywhere else.

On the contrary, they may rot even further the shabby

)latform which now supports the present dangerous international dance on the edge
)f destruction.
I want to suggest, however, that we need not appraise these Coming coo~ereoces

as merely a Western Jump to the soap of the Soviet diplomatiC whip.

!'here is another way of looking at them.

Some of us have looked at them in this

other fasbion for a long time, long before Mr, Khrushchev ' s recent manoeuvres at
Berlin.

In this other lignt, the origins of these conferences are seen to lie in

very different soil .

Seen in this other light, the need for these talks, is a

need that has long existed.

For some of us who have advocated an American ioi-

tiative for peace, it is a source of regret that we of the West have appeared

- 5 to wei t for a promptios from the F.ast to begin these talks.

For us, the origins of these talks do not rest in Mr.
recent statements.

The need arises elsewhere.

which have taken place in the world during

~he

Khrush~bev's

It arises from the vast changes
past decade; more particularly

the changes which have taken place on the European continent; specifically, the
changes which have taken place in Germany.
Let me point out some of these changes.

monumental revolution in technology alone.

Think for a moment of the

In scarcely a decade, this technolog..

ical revolutj.on haS reposed in the hands of men, at once, the power to light new
stars 1n the heavens 8I1d to put out the lights of civilization on earth.

That

change alone has a profound significance for all humanity and endless implica-

tions for the foreign policies of every nation.
There have been other changes of not much les8 significance.

We have

witnessed in Russia in the space of a decade the passing of the era of Stalin;
the

re~overy

fram the devastation of invasion and the rapid develOpment of an

advanced science ar:.d technology.

We have witnessed, dur1pg this decade, vast

upheavals within China and great transitions in the belt of nations--old nations
end nev--stretching half way round the world, from one end of the Afro-Asian

world to the other.
ancient moorings.

A. billion and. a half people have been torn loose from

These changes, too, have a profound significance for us, for

the RuSSians, for the entire world.
In Europe, we have witnessed the comeback of a continent.

Its people,

in t he West, at least, are no loOSer the stunned, war-numbed masses, which the
liberating allied armies found wandering in bewildered impotence, in the midst
of the rubble and overwhelming devastation of '\'lorld 'I'Iar II.

The Europeans have

revite.l1zed themselves, their eCOnomies, their political Ufe.
e.ll Western Europe is emphatically true of Western Germany.

has recovered.

vlhat is true of

An old generation

A new generation has came of age, charged with new vigour, new

ideas, seeking new and constructive directions.
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Can we suppose for a moment that these changes--these vast, unmeasurable ch&?ges and others do not compel changes in the relationships among netions?

It 1s obvious that they do; they alter the facts of the situation with which the
policies of this nation, of all nations must deal 1f there is to be peace .

Obviously, policies devised years asp, in another setting, cannot serve in the
new situation which 13 evolving.

It 1s true that there have been some adjustme"lt.s in the policies of
all the prinCipal nations to these changes.

The C),uestion 1s:

justments sufficient; are they cOming in good tlme1
is there little likelihood

~f

are these ad-

Unless they are l DOt only

a genuine peace being achieved but even the un-

spoken truces which have, heretofore, cushioned the principal pOints of friction
in the world, are endangered.

In the light of the world-vide transition of the

past decade these unstable truces must either be altered by reason] by negotiation, sufficiently and in time, or, sooner or later, they will give way in conflict.
One of these pOints of friction, of possible conflict, exists in
Germany.

In fact, it extends throughout Central Europe.

It is in this region

that the military power" of the twr.t natj.ons capable of ultimate war--the United
States and the Soviet Union--are in the closest of contact.

It is in this

region, too, that most of the residual injustices of World War II are to be
found.
For years now an unspoken agreement, an unstable truce has existed in
this region.

The shaky peace has rested on the avoidance of military incidents

which go beyond the point of no return.

It has rested on the acquiescence of

the Germans, no less than the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in a divided
Germany and a divided Berlin.

It bas rested upon the acquiescence of ourselves

and the peoples of Eastern Europe in Soviet military domination of that region .

- 7For years this has been the reality, despite talk of unification of
Germany, despite talk: of liberation of Eastern Europe, despite Soviet threats and
bland.isbme:lts.

It has been a tolerable, if not, exactly, a comfortable arrangement.

What we have failed to reckon vith, hcy&ver, or at least to reckoD with adequately,

18 that the pressures of

c~

1n the world and, particularly, in Europe and

itself, have been building around this point whether we have reel.lzed it

Ge~

or not, whether or not we and the Russians chose to look at this reality.
waited a long time to face this fact.

We have

I deeply hope that we are prepared to face

it nov and that it is not too late to face it

UOW',

in peace.

This, then, 16 the perspective in wb1ch the coming confereucp.s ought to
be seen.

I repeat they may be worse than useless if

th~y

an unavoidable Western response to a Soviet initiative.

are regarded merely as

They can be

8

God-send if

they are recogniz ed by all concerned as sn opportunity to begln to replace the out:
meded truce in Germany and Central Europe
bette~

~1th

something more durGble, so.methins

for all concerned.
If the beginnings of a stabJe peace in Germany and Central Europe are to

be drawn from tbe impending Conferences, there will have to be a rethinking of
many aspects of the policies wh1ch the Soviet Union bas pursued in that reglon,
which the nations of the West have pursued.

There 'Will have to be give and take,

a quid pro quo, concession to match concession.

We cannot, at thls }?Oint, see the

details of aseeements but the Signposts alOng the road to a rational settlement
are

besi~iDg

to emerge.
1. At Berlin, tor example, we can Bee that there can be no one-

sided Withdrawal ot the forces of treedom from the Western part of the City. That
does not mean, however, that there can be no change in the status of that city.
It means only that any change in the status of that city must be a total change,
which leaves freedom in no les8 an advantageous position than cOlllll.1.mism.

Perhapf

- 8 this total change can be brought about through the interim neutralization of both
free and COlllDUnist Berlin with the help of the Ullited. Nations and under its super-

vision, with free access to the city by all routes guaranteed by that body until
Berlin becomes once again the capitol of a United Germany .
2.

There needs to be at least the beginnings of the beginning on

the problem of German unification, with Germans of East and West contributing more,
much more, than they now are doing to the solution of the problems of unification.
3.

There must be same evidence of a wllllngnes8 aD the part of the

communists in control of the Eastern part of Germany to accept and to extend the
principles of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights.

In particular,

there must be a beginning of the restoration of political rights to ell in that

zone, rights which can be exercised freel y and not under the threat of terror.
4.

There .must be a willingness to accept the reality that

Germany's peaceful ties with Western Europe cannot be ended except by the will of
t he German people themselves.
5.

There must be an equal willingness, bowever, to accept the

premise that the extent and nature of German rearmament is not sacrosanct J that
it can be limited or altered 1n the interests of the security of all nations.
6.

There must be a willingness to accept the premise that the

numbers of foreign troopsJ and t.he nature of their armaments in Germany and 1n
Central Europe 1s subject to negotiation on a give and take basis.

To this end,

the Eden and Gaitskill plans and the Rapacki Plan all merit the closest consideration J provided J I repeat, provided that there are reasonable agreements in the
Geneva Conferences on the control of nuclear testing and the prevention of surprise attack.
M$y

I say that the pOints wbich I have just enumerated are not new.

Otbers bave alluded to them.

I believe that in part at least they represent the

direction in which the Secretary of State was trying to lead the Western nations

- 9 when he was stricken.

I reiterate tonight what I have said many times, that his

illness represents a most ser ious loss to the cause of freedom and of peace and
that I hope deeply that he will recover in time to make his advice, his leadership, and his guidance available.
Ma.y

I say, too, that the points which I have just enumerated as sign-

posts of peace are drawn from the same nine points which I made in a speech in
the Senate two months ago and have repeated in whole or in part on several occasions since that time.

I have not altered those points in any significant way

because I believed then and I believe now that they indicate the way in which the
search for a more durable peace-·a worthwhile peace--is likely to prove most
frui t1\l1.

The discussion which has followed

where bas been very useful.

my

remarks in the Senate and else-

It has helped to clarity and to elaborate.

Most of

all, it has helped, I believe 1 to break the moratorium on new thouspt on this
critical problem of the nation.

This thought in connection with the German Crisie

is coming before, not as in Korea, after the crisis was upon us.

Strengthening the Prospects for Peace
Let me consider, in conclusion, the prospects for peace in Germany and
what can be done to strengthen them.

I think it is essential to emphasize that

peace in Germany depends not· on us alone, not on the Western nations alone but on
the Soviet Union as well.

If the Soviet Union does not seek peace then there will

not be peace. It does not follow, however, that even if the Soviet Union does
seek a durable settlement in Germany and Central Europe that one will automatical.ly emerge .

Peace is a two-way street and we are on one side of it.

We will endanger our own position and the

pro~ects

of peace if we be-

come obsessed with the fascinating game of interpreting the ever-changing charades

-

'

- 10 -

of Soviet policy.

These charadesttla,}' mean peace.

mean neither peace nor war .

They may mean war.

They may

We can only assume as certainty that at any given

time they can mean any of these possibilities and that we must be prepared to face
any of them.

What we can do, beyond this, if we would increase the prospects of

pesce, 1s to get clear in our own minds
as indeed we must .
order to

SO

~y

it 1s that we stand firm in Germany,

We stand firm, not as an end in itself.

forward towards a durable peace .

We stand firm in

If there is to be peace, we, no 1eS8

than the Russians, shall have to put aside the dangerous toys of the propaganda
war, and the chips on the sboulders of the cold war .
both the grins and the frowns .

\'(e shall have to put aside

We shall have to examine and to examine deeply

the problems of peace and see what it is possible to do with them in the light of
the new realities of the situation which confronts us.
these altered problems, new ideaS.

We shall have to apply to

We shall have to bring to these problems a

renewed determination to respond to the deepest desire of our own people and of
all mankind, a new dedication to the search for progress towards a durable peace .

